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Deborah James
Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics, London, UK
ABSTRACT
When South Africa’s credit/debt landscape expanded during the 1990s, this was
justified by some as a new form of inclusion but alleged by others to have
intensified the power and profit of capitalism and acted to the detriment of
householders, thus perpetuating ‘credit apartheid’. Yet, blame cannot be so easily
assigned. Forces of state and market have intertwined to create a redistributive
neoliberalism, enabling brokers – who have played a key role in establishing the
current credit/debt landscape – to insert themselves into the interstices of the
system, making money by adding interest at every point in the value chain.
Apartheid’s spatial separations meant that traders – and later informal
moneylenders – relied on agents to bridge the gap between themselves and the
rural/township world of economic informality. Even attempts at credit reform have
been complicated, and stalled, by the ongoing presence of intermediaries. The
paper explores these dynamics, illustrating how difficult it is to separate bad from
good protagonists or perpetrators from victims.
KEYWORDS South Africa; brokers; indebtedness; economic anthropology; financialisation
Introduction
Scholars critical of new techniques and discourses of development, through which the
poor and marginal have been included through ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP) tech-
niques, and through which ‘everyday life’ has been financialised (Martin 2002;
Langley 2008; Krige 2014), maintain that these techniques obscure new forms of exploi-
tation. They point to the ‘regressive social and distributional effects’ of attempting to
incorporate informality and of drawing on the labour resources of the informal
economy’ to benefit the formal one (Meagher 2013; see also Dolan 2013). The effects
go beyond mere exploitation. Elyachar writes of how loans made to Egyptian youths
induced aspirations for market-oriented trade, yet brought disappointment as promised
forms of citizenship and inclusion failed to deliver (Elyachar 2005). In similarly insi-
dious vein, new credit-based development regimes in Bangladesh reconfigured
‘wages’ or ‘grants’ as ‘loans’ and made newly recruited NGO agents ‘repay’ rather
than designating them as ‘earners’ (Huang 2015). Financialisation, seen as ‘highly detri-
mental to significant numbers of people around the globe’ (Epstein 2005: 5), seems even
more sinister in these newer incarnations; it is driving vulnerable people with few other
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livelihood options to help capitalists fleece other, equally poor, people. Newly config-
ured intermediaries, in the process of creating novel spaces in which their own advan-
tage may be sought, are simultaneously acting to disenfranchise – and undermine the
opportunities of – others.
This paper, set in South Africa, investigates three cases in which such intermediaries
operate. It explores some of the dynamics through which indebtedness, building on or
reacting to earlier exclusionary ‘credit apartheid’ regimes, has intensified; and examines
the limits to planned reforms aimed at addressing the debt problem in both its original
and its later incarnations. It shows how accounts critical of new forms of financial
inclusion, while pertinent to some degree, also have some limitations. First, they over-
estimate the novelty of these credit regimes and the extent to which they are linked to
post-1980s economic liberalisation. Second, they often focus primarily on people in
poorer and more marginalised settings (Elyachar 2005; Han 2012) rather than exploring
those in the ‘new middle classes’ who have their roots in such settings but for whom
credit has been seen as furnishing the means to transcend them. Third, they seem to
imply that, if reform was undertaken, it might be possible once again to return to a
simpler world. In such a world, capitalists might be more visibly counterposed
against those who are exploited by them (as labourers or consumers); and development
planners might be more readily challenged by those who are subjected to their inap-
propriate interventions. This starker opposition might then more easily enable resist-
ance. Countering such assumptions, the paper illustrates the deep-seated nature of
the role played by brokers in assembling the diverse components of financial assem-
blages, bringing those at the BoP into inevitable complicity with its workings.
Relating to the first of these limitations: the cases presented here show how small-
scale entrepreneurs and intermediaries have long been able to take advantage of oppor-
tunities arising because of the racial/spatial disconnections of apartheid. Countering the
critical tone of accounts of the new financial inclusion, it is noteworthy that the role of
these small-scale agents – often viewed as a sign of the sudden recent breakdown of law
and order – might rather be seen as deeply entrenched, constitutive of, and helping to
reproduce a particular social order with a longue durée. From a period even before the
race-based separation of the population into spatially separate territories or homelands,
there was extensive reliance by traders, commercial operators and the like on agents
who bridged the gap between the world of business and the township world of econ-
omic informality. These agents were often difficult to classify since, chameleon-like,
they assumed the features of those employing them or those to whom they were repre-
senting their employers. Such people then started setting up on their own, acting less as
intermediaries and more as informal entrepreneurs in their own right, to purvey a range
of goods to others from similar backgrounds and always relying on credit to do so. They
acquired agents in turn who drew yet further groups of clients into their ambit – and so
these arrangements acquired a self-perpetuating character. When attempts were later
made to regulate ‘credit apartheid’, such agents adapted their operations, enabling
them to exist in parallel with new regimes. Relating to the second limitation, accounts
critical of the new financial inclusion are more attentive to the plight of poor borrowers
than to that of those who are upwardly mobile or ‘middle class’: this paper addresses the
latter situation in particular. But what of the third limitation – the possibility of restor-
ing a world in which the battle lines are more clearly drawn? The cases presented here
illustrate that it is ‘difficult to distinguish between victims and accomplices’ (Gambetta
1988: 170), since many who lend money borrow it as well; borrowers are also lenders.
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‘Mediating’ or ‘brokering’ has ambivalent connotations (Lindquist 2015): it can be
construed as positive (producing peaceful outcomes to difficult confrontations) or nega-
tive (suggesting operators who insert themselves between diverse parties so as to gain
opportunistically). In classic studies of broker-style relationships, the latter valence
has predominated. Clients, it is argued, abandon their potentially open access to the
state and/or major markets in order to gain the benefits of going through an intermedi-
ary (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980; Randeraad 1998; James 2011; Lindquist 2015). In doing
so, such clients are often unaware that a direct connection to, and trust in, state officials
or businessmen might be possible; their recognition of such a possibility would likely
put such intermediaries out of business (Gambetta 1988: 172). Indeed, those who
seek to combat the dependency inherent in intermediation have been inspired by just
such a vision: that of re-establishing, or newly establishing, open access and public
trust. Doing so would restrict the ability of brokers1 to reproduce the circumstances
which enable them to continue operating. However, the actions of such brokers are
rarely prompted by a wish for profit or power alone. Their creative ability to respond
to situations of inequality and/or social disruption often involves the weaving together
of diverse threads to construct a plausible story which they tell those who depend upon
them – and indeed themselves – about the morality of their own motivations (Piliavsky
2014). Although much of the writing on intermediaries, like Arce and Long’s classic
paper (1993), has been concerned with scenarios of political legitimacy, in which
small-time leaders or low-level civil servants seek support among those unable to act
on their own, I have argued elsewhere that the role of entrepreneurs (James 2011) –
and, I would now add, of financial agents and intermediaries – is equally usefully con-
sidered in economic settings, or those where the boundaries between state and market,
the political and the economic, are increasingly difficult to determine. This paper shows
how a proliferation of agents have taken up their roles in the credit/debt machinery,
becoming its essential components.
To characterise matters in this way might sound deterministic, but there are many
sources of variation and flux. Worldwide, there is the notoriously unpredictable char-
acter of the global financial system; locally there are elements that might be analysed as
capitalist and commodified in character (using a more Marxist perspective) and others
involving local solidarity-based or reciprocal forms of exchange (using a more Maussian
one). Brokers strive to bring these two sets of elements, and their associated modalities
of payment or exchange, into the same frame. Their efforts interweave the formal world
of capitalist values with an informal one made of household-based connections and
small-scale relationships which are more reciprocal in character.
Following a short context-setting section which discusses features of South Africa’s
new lending, the paper presents three instances. These are drawn from ethnographic
fieldwork conducted between 2008 and 2010, well as from ethnographically informed
readings (see Comaroff & Comaroff 1992) of parliamentary submissions and sources
such as memoirs, novels and journalistic accounts. The nature of the topic called for
multi-sited rather than single-location fieldwork. To understand how the alleged abol-
ition of ‘credit apartheid’ affected its former victims, participant observation and inter-
views were conducted both in settings where it had prevailed – in spaces originally
sequestered from white cities and farmlands by apartheid’s social engineering, such
as the low- to middle-income neighbourhood of Sunview in Soweto, and Impalahoek
village in Mpumalanga – as well as in newly integrated post-apartheid settings in
larger urban centres such as Knysna and Pretoria (see Figure 1). Informants included
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medium to well-paid employees of the government as well as low- to middle-income
earners. Attentive to policy issues and the pronouncements of agents in the state, the
corporate sector, and the world of human rights and NGOs, I interviewed employees
in the banking sector, registered micro-lenders, some community lenders (mashonisas),
and the debt counsellors who seek to regulate, curb or counter their activities.
Each case illustrates the role played by intermediaries in South Africa’s particular
version of financialised indebtedness at a different point in time. The first outlines
how agents who work for furniture and appliance retailers act as brokers who
assemble formality and social embeddedness. The second gives an account of illegal
moneylending – the context where one might most expect a version of informal entre-
preneurialism – which took its use of agents from the furniture trade. The third dis-
cusses state attempts to cut out these small-scale agents, analysing contestations over
the attempted regulation of creditors’ ‘reckless lending’.
Context – The New Lending
South Africa saw rising levels of consumer indebtedness from the 1990s onwards,
especially among those people who are – or seek to be – upwardly mobile. The situation
is not unique: similar levels of personal indebtedness, often twinned with aspiration, are
evident worldwide. In this setting, however, the phenomenon took on a specific char-
acter, arising as it did at the moment of democratic transition in 1994. The move away
Figure 1. Map of fieldsites.
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from – and the concerted attempt to abolish – credit apartheid, combined with the pro-
gressive liberalisation and financialisation of the economy, a massive rise in expec-
tations for personal material wealth and all that it can provide, and the sudden
availability of short-term loans at high rates of interest (offered by moneylenders
both registered and unregistered) meant that a huge demand was met by a burgeoning
supply. My interviews revealed a startlingly racialised credit/debt landscape, schema-
tically represented in Figure 1. White, Afrikaans-speaking civil servants were steadily
ousted and their places taken by black members of the electorate. Flush with cash
from their redundancies and emboldened by the repeal of the Usury Act that for
many decades had capped the interest rate and that had been now abolished in
the interests of extending credit to all, many of these ousted civil servants established
‘micro-lending’ businesses (sector 2 in Figure 2), charging high interest rates (Roth
2004: 41–5).2 In an ironic twist, this enabled these former civil servants to continue
drawing parts of the salaries of those who had now replaced them, as well as the
social grants of those lower down the scale. Replacing the fixed assets that lenders
traditionally require by way of security (Roth 2004: 62), these payments from the
state came to serve as collateral for what are misleadingly known as ‘unsecured’
loans (see Anders 2009 for similar cases in Malawi; Parry 2012 for India). The
new civil servants and grant recipients in turn, despite receiving regular payments,
needed more than what those could buy. The only option was to ‘borrow speculative
resources [from the] future and transform them into concrete resources to be used in
the present’ (Peebles 2010: 226). Lenders, having direct access to the bank accounts
into which the salaries of this new swath of civil servants (or the grants of welfare
recipients) were paid, were easily able to recoup their debts. Some, in sector 2, made
liberal use of garnishee or emoluments attachment orders, as described below. Others
used the system – only outlawed at the end of the 1990s, and hence no longer used
by creditors in sector 2, but still widespread in sector 3 – of confiscating a debtor’s
ATM card and identity document in order to ensure repayment (see Breckenridge
2005, 2010 for a similar practice in India, see Parry 2012). All-in-all, this precipitous
transition opened up new gaps which intermediaries were able to bridge, by match-
ing creditors who had never previously lent money with debtors who had not for-
merly borrowed it to the same degree.
Figure 2. Credit supply.
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Possible sources of credit have thus proliferated since the end of apartheid. A con-
sumer is able to borrow from many banks, use many credit cards, buy a car with
finance and furniture on hire purchase (HP), and hold store cards from an array of
retailers, as well as having access to micro-loans, both formal (legal) and informal
(illegal). Often, consumers, having been able to take out loans with very few checks
being made on their income or creditworthiness, borrow from one source in order to
repay another: a practice that has not noticeably reduced despite attempts at state regu-
lation (James 2015a: 85, 157).
The precipitous onset of borrowing and lending possibilities that were unleashed by
these neatly intersecting forces resulted, however, not in a classic free-market situation,
but in a mediated form of capitalism – one partly modelled on its earlier precedents.
Forces of state and market intertwine. Intermediaries, their patrons and their clients,
using free-market style savvy, divert state resources such as civil servant salaries and
welfare grants or use these as security in their lending operations, thus enabling
them to make ‘money from nothing’ (James 2015a) in a redistributive version of neo-
liberalism.3 Put differently, ‘neoliberal means… ensure the ever wider spread of redis-
tribution’ (James 2012: 37).
Assembling Credit Scams in the Furniture Retail Trade
In South Africa, during the twentieth century, where increasingly draconian racial sep-
aration created captive markets and where loans from the mainstream financial sector
were mostly unavailable to black people, a system evolved of selling them furniture and
appliances on HP. Agents, mostly drawn from black township settings themselves,
helped facilitate such sales. (Brokers more generally have often been ‘drawn into new
forms of translocal relations’ (Lindquist 2015).) Cash-strapped consumers sometimes
bought (and buy) more than they can afford, and are regularly sent reminders to
repay outstanding debts, failing which their wages may be attached or their goods
repossessed. Not all, however, are as passive in the face of the powerful furniture indus-
try as might be supposed. My interviews revealed how many have used the fact of being
contracted to pay retailers on instalment to enhance, rather than contradict, frugality,
by carefully paying off each item in its turn while selectively avoiding relatives’ requests
for money. In cases of default, furniture-store agents sometimes opportunistically
exploit the spatial and social gap between (white) retailer and (black) buyer. But they
have also found – and helped customers to find – room for manoeuvre in the fact
that, when goods are bought on instalment, time elapses between present possession
and future payment. The concept of ‘trust’ – often implicitly denying the inherent mis-
trust that would otherwise be inevitable (Gambetta 1988; Shipton 2007) – is elaborated
as a moral discourse by both the corporate interests that expect timely repayment and
the wily salesmen that help customers to evade this, or pocket proceeds for themselves.
The business, all in all, is characterised by a mixture of racist paternalism, sharp prac-
tice, and intimacy.
Such sales practices are of long standing, especially amongst the early-urbanising
black middle class. ‘On all sides’, observed American social worker Ray Phillips in
Johannesburg in the 1930s, ‘one is informed that the “hire-purchase” system of acquir-
ing pianos and furniture is responsible for much of the indebtedness of the Africans’.
Furniture dealers routinely sold items to customers, on instalments, without checking
their ability to repay; the inevitable result was that the latter, after paying some accounts
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would be ‘unable to make ends meet. He goes to another shop where he contracts
another debt and so on continually’ (Phillips 1938: 41). Those ‘to whom money is
owing and to whom promises have been made’, would be paid as long as they
arrived before other creditors: ‘the rest are put off with various promises until a later
time’ (Phillips 1938: 40). The embedding of similar practices in more recent times
has been documented by Miriam Tlali in her novel Muriel at Metropolitan (1988),
which talks of the moral dilemmas faced by a black employee in a furniture business,
and journalist David Cohen in his book People who have stolen from me (2004).
Some 80 years later, black people continue to rely on the furniture retail sector for
credit: something that must be understood in its broader context. Their century-long
exclusion from land ownership, and limited possession of movable property, meant
that other sources of collateral were sought: the repossession of furniture became
routine. Credit was offered on unfavourable terms, via a ‘dysfunctional market’ (DTI
2004: 22). Interest rates are high (Schreiner et al. 1997), and added ‘charges’ for
credit insurance inflate them still further (DTI 2002, see Gregory 2012). Impalahoek
school teacher Muzila Nkosi told me ‘you’ll pay R15,000 for something that only
costs R5,000’. Having suffered the ignominies of this system when a furniture store
placed a garnishee order on his bank account – at significant cost – for allegedly
missing a monthly repayment, he and his co-teachers started a savings club, Thiakene
Machaka (build yourselves, relatives). ‘I wanted to prevent members from buying goods
on credit’, he said.4 These high costs, according to retailers, helped compensate for
frequent defaults or pay the costs of repossessions, making up for their exposure to
financial risk given the financial insecurity, and/or occasional resistance to making
these payments, of their targeted buyers. Many householders I spoke to, despite their
exploitation via this form of ‘credit apartheid’, have doggedly kept up their repayments
and waited to buy the next item only once the previously purchased one had been paid
off. Often buying household items as part of a trousseau on the occasion of a daughter’s
marriage, their participation in this market arose within a ritualisation of the life-course,
and exposed them to gradually increasing expenditure, and expanding credit access,
over time.
Although the business is characterised by great formality, with meticulous record
keeping and regular mailing out of invoices in brown envelopes to remind purchasers
of what they owe, it also involves personalised relationships and ‘trust’: especially
between the retailer and his agents who hail from the neighbourhoods in which sales
were being made and on whom that retailer relies to facilitate the steady payment of
instalments or repossess items in cases of default (Cohen 2004: 63). But the commis-
sion-based character of agents’ work, combined with the perceived unfairness of the
terms offered to clients, meant that ‘scams’ became common. Both employees and
agents conspired or entered into complicity with such clients (Cohen 2004: 42–6) or
were tempted to do so (Tlali 1979: 82–3). These, from the agents’ point of view,
made up for employers’ alleged meanness by enabling them to top up their meagre sal-
aries (Tlali 1979: 151–2). In one case, agents set off into the township on a hazardous
quest to repossess an electric cooker, only to find that it had been sold on. After driving
still further into a more remote township area, they ran out of petrol and were unable to
make the return trip since their employer refused to cover the cost of their fuel (Cohen
2004: 58–61). When agents colluded with customers in such situations, it was not only
to enhance their earnings but also to compensate them for the negative way they were
viewed by fellow members of the black community for being complicit in ‘squeezing
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money out of [clients] to swell the coffers of their white bosses’ (Tlali 1979: 82–3). From
the customers’ perspective, these ‘scams’made it possible, at least temporarily, to escape
the terms laid down and interest rates charged by the furniture outlets. Relying on such
intermediaries gave the business a personalised character despite its reliance on docu-
mentation, written records and the like (Tlali 1979: 58).
In Impalahoek, agent/customer collusion was common. Ace Ubisi described a typical
situation, involving a well-known store, Ellerines, which has a branch in a nearby plaza.
Repossession agents visit an errant client, explaining that the furniture is soon to be
confiscated. The client agrees that he has defaulted, but pleads for some more time
to pay. Attempting to avoid having furniture carted out of the house, the client pays
the agent a bribe to return to his employers and say ‘there is no-one in the house’. If,
however, the defaulting client is unwilling or unable to pay a bribe, the agent
embarks on another scam. Repossessing the furniture, he sells it to another client,
who is unaware that the agent, acting on his own, has now become the seller. Pocketing
the difference between the original amount owed and what he gleaned from the new
sale, he paid it at Ellerines ‘as if it was the original owner of the furniture who was
paying’. Store owners and managers found themselves in a sort of arms race as they
attempted to outwit their agents (see Cohen 2004: 149), and customers could be disad-
vantaged in the process. The crooked agent mentioned in the story above, for example,
was exposed and fired, but continued to travel around to prospective buyers, benefiting
from villagers’ ignorance of his dismissal, requesting deposits and offering reassurance
that the items would soon be delivered. When the furniture failed to arrive, he was
forced to leave town once outraged villagers discovered the trickery.5
Overall, then, these brokers assemble elements of business acumen and formal
record-keeping formality with elements of social embeddedness and community-mind-
edness. The personalised relationships they construct with customers are relied on by
the retailers who employ them: it makes up for these customers lack of a more gener-
alised trust in the broader credit system overall (see Gambetta 1988). Meanwhile the
reliance on agents, and the forms of collusion-but-dissembling which they practice,
has spread into other realms.
Loansharks and Their Intermediaries
Blurred boundaries exist between informal moneylending (sector 3, Figure 1) and its
recently regularised and regulated counterpart, ‘micro-lending’ (sector 2), with bor-
rowers frequently confusing the two and using the same term –mashonisa – to describe
them both. Both increased during the 1990s (Siyongwana 2004), though the rate of the
unregistered variety is more difficult to track than its registered counterpart. There were
estimated to be 30,000 such moneylenders in operation in 2004 (Ardington et al. 2004:
619), but such figures obscure the fact that those in sector 3 include both salaried civil
servants and social grant recipients (and indeed many other kinds of employees) who
lend money alongside their other forms of livelihood; and also that many rotating credit
savings clubs also lend out money at interest (Bahre 2007; James 2015b) while its
members also borrow from other sources. Borrowers and lenders, or ‘victims’ and
‘accomplices’ (Gambetta 1988: 170), thus cannot be easily distinguished. Moneylenders,
operating beyond the system and aware of the illegality of their activities, nonetheless
aim at greater economic formality themselves. Ironically, policy-makers’ attempts to
‘bank the unbanked’ were here at odds with state regulation of illegal moneylending.
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A teacher of financial literacy told me that she was often approached by mashonisas for
advice on how to bank their own proceeds and securely store the proceeds of their
enterprise without their illicit activities becoming visible to the authorities.6
Were such lenders purposefully preventing their clients from getting open access to
the market (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980; Gambetta 1988)? Initially at least, these lenders’
businesses arose as a result of black householders’ inability to access credit from the
formal sector except by buying furniture on instalment, inclining them instead
towards community lenders who often offered more reasonable terms in any case
(Roth 2004: 52). These lenders often had a personal connection to borrowers, whose
requests for loans were, in many cases, why these lenders started doing business in
the first place (Krige 2011). This community embeddedness effectively caps the interest
rate, with lenders often extending the loan past month-end without calculating an
accompanying escalation. To insist on full repayment would make repayment difficult,
give the lender a reputation for unfairness, increase the chances that violence be used
against him/her, and prompt complaints to the authorities (Krige 2011: 154–8).
Some lend only small amounts (less than R300), must adjust their collection arrange-
ments to fit in with local norms (charging 15% interest monthly, being flexible in cal-
culating interest over time, lacking formal collateral).7 Since ‘the termination of future
contracts’ by neighbours acts to regulate such moneylending (Roth 2004: 99), the local
mashonisa does not necessarily resemble the unscrupulous baseball bat-wielding loan
shark of literary accounts, since his desire to stay in business controls the terms
under which he seeks repayment.
It is in the case of bigger moneylenders, who typically charge 50% interest monthly,
and many of whom similarly combine this income source with others, that the employ-
ing of agents and intermediaries has taken hold, showing strong similarities to what
happens in the HP furniture business. Solomon Mahlaba told me that moneylending
in and around the village of Impalahoek was initiated by a white farmer, Jaap Fourie,
in the late 1980s. Some of Solomon’s nieces, who worked on Jaap Fourie’s farm,
approached their employer via the farm foreman or induna to give them an advance
on their meagre wages. The induna advised the farmer that he could make money by
charging interest at the rate of 20% per month: a practice already well known in the
townships. Unbeknown to the farmer, he then inserted himself as a broker or agent,
charging R30 for the service. Encompassing this commission, the rate of interest
went up to 50% per month, which is where it remains for larger moneylenders nation-
wide. The induna, Nkuna, started using the proceeds to lend money in his own right,
eventually enabling him to leave behind his farm job altogether. He became the
pre-eminent moneylender in the area.8
When Nkuna became a moneylender, he acquired a new agent who set up indepen-
dently. Mathebula, an air force employee, needed to pay for a family funeral and was
given a loan by Nkuna – of R15,000. Later needing a further loan, he went to
another mashonisa, who lent him R10,000 and confiscated his card. From 1999 until
2005 ‘he was working formashonisa… After 2005 he went to the very samemashonisa.
He was looking for a part-time job… . He said ‘people know that I’m a regular custo-
mer, they know that I was owing you a lot of money.… I will bring in some of your
money and I will do the job’. His claim that, having the trust of community
members, he would be in a good position to follow-up unpaid loans using trust
rather than more violent means, persuaded Nkuna. But his new agent, Mathebula,
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started generating extra profit using his knowledge of the differentiated timing of gov-
ernment salary payments.
… this guy will lend to teachers who are paid on the 22nd and his colleagues will be paid on the
15th. All the hospitals, air force, soldiers are paid on the 15th. So he will lend money from the 1st
up to the 15th. So those who are getting paid on the 15th, they will give it to him. He will take the
money as well and lend to the teachers – those who are paid on the 22nd – from the 16th up to the
22nd. Then on the 22nd he collects. From the 23rd he will lend the money to the police who are
paid on month-end. So he can make R85,000, but the mashonisa is looking for R60,000…
unaware that that guy is making a profit.… he was making money for himself now but the
mashonisa didn’t know. So he was working for mashonisa for more than 2 years.
Upon being discovered and ‘dismissed’ by Nkuna, he set up as a mashonisa on his own.
Ace Ubisi put it like this: ‘He started as a borrower, now he is a lender’.9 The transition
from one to the other, or from borrower via agent to lender, involved becoming aware,
during all his years of being in debt to a moneylender, of how good a money-making
strategy this was.
When informal moneylending expanded in the 1980s, and even more so from the
mid-1990s onwards (Siyongwana 2004; Barchiesi 2011: 200, 210), credit apartheid
was, in theory, coming to an end, but financialisation or ‘making money from
nothing’ had become the only game in town (Ardington et al. 2004; Daniels 2004; Por-
teous & Hazelhurst 2004). Around this time, moneylenders also began to acquire their
financialised technique of keeping borrowers’ ATM cards, aping the system that had
been used by the new micro-lenders (sector 2) shortly before this was outlawed at
the end of that decade. These arrangements involve a combination of willing engage-
ment by borrowers, on the one hand – again involving an element of moral embedding
and ‘trust’ – with resentment on the other hand, as they find themselves gradually
drawn in and with little choice but to borrow again. ‘In the long run’ said one Impala-
hoek resident, ‘they exploit you because the interest they are charging is so high. You
won’t ever finish paying. You pay and pay, and then you realize “now I’m being
exploited”.’10
It was liberalisation that had enabled South Africa’s credit/debt revolution and
allowed lenders of all kinds to extend loans with impunity. The attempts at regulation
and registration that followed turned some of these lenders more explicitly into outlaws
than they might have been. They were now planted more squarely in the informal
domain where community embeddedness had once been a key feature of their business
(see Hart 1973). But these mashonisas, previously involved (often via their agents) in
relationships of trust, had now become beings for whom the ready and uninhibited
flow of cash through accounts – facilitated by financial inclusion and especially by
financialised techniques such as ATM-linked bank accounts – enabled ready
payment and made things more financially formal. This automation might have dimin-
ished the opportunities for agents like Mathebula, while keeping his dealings secret
from his ‘employer’, to craft his own personalised relationships with clients. But, it
might equally have served him as a strategy in his endeavour of assembling a livelihood
by bringing together increasingly formalised and bureaucratic arrangements with ever
more informal and trust-based ones.
If the cases above show the origins of the credit/debt system and illustrate how it
played out in the post-democracy period, the proposed solutions gave brokers
further opportunities – or consolidated existing ones – to profit from hybridising the
formal and the informal.
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Credit ‘Post-Apartheid’: Reformers and Small-Time Creditors
Reformers, conscious of the moral transgressions inherent in credit apartheid, proposed
to establish new systems of lending from which all might benefit. These were intended
to obviate the need for black people to depend on HP agreements as they had done for
decades, or rely on community moneylenders as they had started to do more recently
(Ardington et al. 2004: 607). They would put in place new arrangements which would
work for all and promote trust in the public good rather than forcing people to rely,
instead, on informal, often violent, relationships with intermediaries (Gambetta
1988). These reforms worked less well than their designers intended, however, an
outcome that owed much to the way multiple protagonists were invested in the continu-
ation of the system-as-it-was, or were ready to shape-shift and assemble financial
elements in new ways.
Attempting to find a solution to problems of indebtedness, government officials in
the Department of Trade and Industry had entered into collaborations with human
rights activists-turned-debt activists. One of these, Xolela May, told me how he had
been spurred into action by his own embeddedness in the township community of
Langa, near Cape Town, where he had gained an intimate knowledge of how new
lenders (in sector 2) beyond the usual furniture retail sector were extending credit.11
With debtors being taken to court and repossessions carried out in record numbers,
it was a broad spectrum of problems relating to ‘reckless lending’ that he and other
designers of the National Credit Act (NCA), effective from 2007, intended to
tackle.12 The act was ambiguous; however, it aimed not only to protect vulnerable
and financially uninformed borrowers from unscrupulous creditors, but also, in the
new spirit of affirmative action, to open up new possibilities for black business in
fields which had previously been dominated by whites and other settler groups.
Given that these new opportunities inevitably involved small-scale entrepreneurs
extending credit in one way or another, the two aims proved to be at odds with each
other.
As interested parties debated the proposed bill in parliament, details came to light of
the earlier – and continuing – operations of credit apartheid. One problem was the way
creditors had become accustomed to securing direct and involuntary repayment: they
were no longer standing in line to ‘get the money’ as had been the case when observed
by Ray Philips in the 1930s. Clerks in Magistrates’ Courts were readily, and in epidemic
numbers, issuing garnishee orders.13 Creditors who present an employer with a gar-
nishee order authorised by the clerk and countersigned by the indebted employee are
entitled to take a portion of the debtor’s monthly pay before the employee receives it.
But employers and policy-makers alike were noticing the negative consequences of
this trend for the well-being of civil servants and factory workers. BMW, with its
large car factories in the Eastern Cape, commissioned research which established the
illegality of many practices used by debt collectors to attach workers’ salaries: the pres-
surising of debtors into signing the ‘consent to judgment’, normally required in proof of
their having agreed to the arrangements, or the blatant use of forged signatures on these
forms (Haupt et al. 2008; Haupt & Coetzee 2008); and the passing of orders by retailers
in courts far from employees’ places of work which were then impossible to challenge
without travelling long distances. ‘Debt administrators’ – some of them discredited
lawyers – were also using practices of equally dubious legality, for example by charging
a fee each time a garnishee order was granted on the wage or salary of the debtor
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(Smit 2008: 1–2; James 2015a: 62, 73). If one reads the judgement in a class action court
case, brought to the Western Cape High Court, that eventually ruled against some of
these practices in 2015, the list of respondents gives a sense of the odd bedfellows –
with proliferating sub-intermediaries interpolating themselves into each gap that
opened up – that had been gleaning rich pickings from these arrangements. Drawn
from among the new micro-lending companies in sector 2, they included Mavava
Trading, Onecor, Amplisol, Triple Advanced Investments, Bridge Debt, Las Manos
Investments, Polkadots Properties, Money Box Investments, Maravedi Credit Solutions,
Icom, Villa Des Roses, Triple Advanced Investments.14 The names, even without
further information, give an indication as to the fly-by-night character of these
businesses. All-in-all, the negative consequences of debt (they ranged from people
resigning from their jobs to escape creditors, through cashing in their pensions, to
tragic measures such as suicide) were here being intensified by illegal and unregulated
collection practices. In response, some employers were resorting to paying wages
directly in cash, or using pre-paid money cards delinked from bank accounts, in
order to avoid creditors’ getting their hands on the money.15
Human rights lawyers like Xolela May were inspired with reforming zeal by a sense
of moral outrage. They had watched their neighbours suffer furniture repossessions, the
confiscation of earnings, and the stripping bare of bank accounts, by creditors (and their
agents) in defiance of the law. During the parliamentary debates on the NCA, it was
suggested, rather than passing new legislation, that the Magistrates’ Court Act simply
be amended by making it mandatory to have judgments ‘dealt with in an open court
of law’ rather than being given, either fraudulently or in ignorance, by uneducated
clerks of the court.16 But this suggestion was not taken up, and it would take another
10 years before the Western Cape High Court case definitively established the illegality
of these practices.
As reforms aimed at curbing these excesses, and as related practices of ‘reckless
lending’, were debated in parliament, assorted micro-lenders in sector 2 energetically
contested these to protect their innovative lending assemblages. An organisation repre-
senting their interests, Balboa, argued that to curb the activities of lenders would be to
outlaw the livelihoods of many low-income people (including financial intermediaries).
The well-worn practice of ‘direct selling’ on credit and on commission by salesmen vis-
iting employees’ places of work came up for debate. Balboa vigorously defended the
rights of such sellers, pointing out that the reason why they visit the ‘work places of
potential consumers to enter into loan agreements’ is largely because such ‘consumers
are not able during office hours to attend at the credit provider’s physical premises’, and
hence that visiting them at the workplace offers a ‘convenient, speedy and efficient’ sol-
ution. Prohibiting such a practice, they argued, would result in the closure or restruc-
turing of ‘many small credit operator businesses relying solely on agents to sell their
goods and/or products to employees at their work’ and in these agents’ loss of liveli-
hood: ‘a large section of the economy will effectively be destroyed overnight.17
The high-minded tone of this submission, which defends the needs of small-scale
entrepreneurs, obscures moral ambivalences about borrowing and lending. Balboa
Finance is one of those organisations offering unsecured loans at high rates of interest.
Yet, it is likely that many of its clients, operating along the same lines as ‘Avon ladies’
(Dolan & Scott 2009) and other multi-level marketers in schemes that are pervasive in
South Africa, are using the money they borrow to establish their petty enterprises: yet
another case of borrowers-become-lenders. As it turned out, these sellers’ practices were
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left unregulated by the act: preventing them from selling on credit might well have cir-
cumscribed their activities while leaving bigger lenders untouched. In the same year, a
case came to court in which a small-scale creditor of this kind instructed a lawyer to
repossess the house of a borrower in order to recoup outstanding debts. The judge
ruled that it was unconstitutional to deprive people of their right to housing, but the
Minister of Justice protested, observing that removing the right to repossess such prop-
erty would act not only against ‘big firms’ but also against informal sellers-on-credit,
often barely better off than their customers.18
Some of the points noted in this section might seem to substantiate the claim that
South African law is biased in favour of creditors (Boraine & Roestoff 2002: 4).
Whether lenders hail from large corporations from sector 1, or smaller ones in sector
2, little seems to stand in the way of their having loans repaid. Although they must cal-
culate rates of non-repayment, or run risks imposed by their reliance on agents
embedded in local contexts, such disadvantages seem to be outweighed, more recently,
by the freedom to recoup loans using techniques such as garnishee orders; and by the
prevalence of intermediaries, debt administrators, and collectors willing to facilitate the
collection of loans. In other respects, however, the contradictory character of the
reforms that were implemented is revealed. For every piece of protection offered to bor-
rowers, one of the semi-formal income-generating opportunities embraced by brokers
inhabiting marginal spaces might be forfeit. All-in-all, it is the roles they play that must
qualify any claim of creditor advantage, since so many people merge the role of lender
with that of borrower.
Conclusion
Is people’s powerlessness in the face of initiatives undertaken by powerful interests
augmented if neoliberal forces persuade them into complicity, such that their daily
livelihoods depend both on their participation in it (and on their drawing others,
as brokers, into its ambit, making its techniques intimate rather than remote)?
Where critical accounts emphasise the newness of such schemes of inclusion
(Dolan 2013; Elyachar 2005; Huang 2015; Meagher 2013), individuals in South
African society have long devised ways to challenge the terms of their exclusion by
incorporating themselves into money-making activities. Attempts to tackle the
problem of credit apartheid by incorporating the marginal and previously politically
disenfranchised in fact ended up entrenching the embeddedness of agents, go-
betweens and petty entrepreneurs in the system as-it-was – or enabled them to
seize on new opportunities. In this setting of rapid change, where forces of state
and market have intertwined to create a redistributive neoliberalism, brokers do
not merely negotiate between fixed positionalities, or translate between and merge
previously irreconcilable points of view. Instead they bring into being new socio-econ-
omic positions and identities, as I have argued elsewhere (James 2011). Countervail-
ing discourses – of disembedded financial formality versus trust and intimacy – play
their part in perpetuating, while enabling the continual readjustment, of a set of sys-
temic yet creatively innovative arrangements. Intermediaries, repossession agents, and
moneylenders use personalised relationships to challenge the restrictions of formal
inclusion by assembling new terrains in which to operate.
Gaining access to the money – however small the amount – of the widest poss-
ible range of people is essential to generate profit in a system based more on
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consumption and rent-seeking than production. This paper has shown some of the
underpinnings and contradictory aspects of the situation, bearing out Gambetta’s
observations about the difficulty of distinguishing ‘between victims and accomplices’
(1998: 170). The onset of borrowing and lending possibilities unleashed by
South Africa’s credit/debt revolution produced a peculiarly mediated kind of
capitalism.
Notes
1. I use the terms ‘broker’, ‘intermediary’, and ‘agent’ interchangeably. See the introduction for
further explanation on how these figures act as assemblers, as connective agents who bring
together assemblages that consist of different actors, institutions, and resources.
2. “Micro-lending” is locally defined as oriented only to consumption, as distinct from develop-
ment-oriented “micro-credit” (see Kar 2013) which is known for its relative lack of popularity
in South Africa (Reinke 1998).
3. Seekings and Nattrass have used the term ‘distributional regime’ (2005, 314) to discuss this
extensive reliance on state resources.
4. Muzila Nkosi, Impalahoek, 26 March 2009.
5. Ace Ubisi, Impalahoek, 16 August 2008.
6. Rebecca Matladi, Johannesburg, 15 April 2010.
7. Samuel Kgore, Impalahoek, 22 August 2008; see also James (2015a: 111).
8. Solomon Mahlaba, Impalahoek, 26 March 2009.
9. Ace Ubisi, Impalahoek, 23 August 2008.
10. Solomon Mahlaba, Impalahoek, 26 March 2009.
11. Xolela May, Knysna, 8 October 2008.
12. http://www.acts.co.za/national-credit-act-2005/.
13. These are known as debt recovery orders in the UK.
14. University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99 (8 July 2015), http://www.saflii.org/za/
cases/ZAWCHC/2015/99.html#.
15. Tony Beamish, personal communication.
16. Commentary By Vincent Van Der Merwe, J C Grobler & Burger Inc., 5 August 2005, presented
to the portfolio committee for Trade and Industry.
17. Balboa submission on the National Credit Bill, 28 July 2005, presented to the portfolio commit-
tee for Trade and Industry.
18. Jaftha v. Schoeman and Others; van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others, 2005(2) SA 140 (CCT 74/03),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/25.html. Thanks to Glenda Webster for bringing the
case to my attention.
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